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Abstract
We explore computational approaches for
artificial agents to play the ultimatum game. We
compare our agents’ behavior with that
predicted by classical game theory, as well as
behavior found in experimental (or behavioral)
economics investigations. In particular, we study
the following questions: How do artificial agents
perform in playing the ultimatum game against
fixed rules, dynamic rules, and rotating rules?
How do coevolving artificial agents perform?
Will learning software agents do better? What is
the value of intelligence? What will happen when
smart learning agents play against dumb (nolearning) agents? What will be the impact of
agent memory size on performance? We provide
some initial experimental results pertaining to
these questions.
1. Introduction
The ultimatum game has been widely accepted in
the study of bargaining and negotiation.
(Subsequently, we will not distinguish these very
similar concepts.) For example, any trading rule
can be characterized as a negotiation over how to
split the surplus resulting from a trade (see e.g.,
Croson 1996). There has been a recent growing
interest in the ultimatum game by game theorists,
economists, psychologists, and computer
scientists, among others (Binmore, Gale and
Samuelson 1995; Bolton and Zwick 1995;
Burnell, Evans and Yao 1999; Güth 1995; Huck
1999; Kagel, Kim, and Moser 1996; Knez and
Camerer 1995; Roth et al. 1991; Ruffle 1998;
Straub and Murnighan 1995). The importance of
understanding the ultimatum game extends
beyond purely scientific considerations. It is
important as well from an e-commerce
applications perspective: if we are to field
intelligent, (semi-) autonomous agents in
conducting bargaining and negotiation in virtual
communities (such as in Internet markets), much
remains to be learned about the principles of

design and management of such artificial agents
(Kimbrough and Wu 2001). We have conducted
a series of investigations into the dynamics of
agents, having varying degrees of intelligence, in
strategic situations (or games). These
investigations grew out of, and advance, our
previous studies of the dynamics of gameplaying agents. Strategic situations are
ubiquitous. How do and how can learning,
deliberating, adaptive agents perform in strategic
situations? How do their performances compare
with those of strategy-centric agents? How well
do different identity-centric agents, using various
learning and adaptation regimes, fare against one
another in strategic situations? How well do
various adaptive mechanisms perform when
playing with humans? Are there simple adaptive
mechanisms whose play behavior maps well to
that of human subjects?
Despite its simplicity, the ultimatum game
presents a challenge in understanding negotiation
behavior by humans. The relevant literature can
be roughly divided into two approaches for
addressing the ultimatum game: the classical
game theory approach and the experimental
economics (or behavioral) approach. The
simplest version of the ultimatum game is as
follows. Two players, A and B, must decide how
to split N dollars. At the beginning of each play
of the game, Player A decides how much x ∈ [0,
N] dollars to offer to player B. Player B can
reject the offer, resulting in both of the players
getting nothing; or player B can accept the offer,
in which case he gets the x dollars and player A
keeps the rest N-x dollars. For simplicity, we
assume x to be integer only. Figure 1 shows the
extensive form of the game.
Classical game theory asserts that any rational
Player A should offer a tiny amount, say for
example, one penny out of one dollar, to Player
B, and player B will always accept this tiny
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offer. This outcome is indeed sub-game perfect.
(It passes the Nash Equilibrium test for every sub
game, i.e., sub-trees in the extensive form).

A
x
B
Reject

Accept
(N-x, x)

(0,0)

Figure 1: The ultimatum game in extensive
form.
Further, there exits an infinite number of SubGame Perfect Equilibria in this game (Skyrms
1996), they are along the line of x + y = N,
although the classical game theory is silent as to
which Nash Equilibrium will be finally selected
and used to predict the human behavior. Given
this weakness in terms of prediction, it is not
surprising that experimental economists found
that classical game theory predictions (e.g., the
penny equilibrium) were not supported by
empirical evidence when human subjects were
playing the ultimatum game. On the contrary,
humans when playing the game in various lab
settings, tend to reject offers that do not meet
their threshold amounts of share (e.g., Croson
1996; Kagel, Kim and Moser 1996; Roth et al.
1991). These findings, independently conducted
by a number of researchers (some even consider
cultural differences), were consistent, thus
credible. Various explanations and theories have
been offered for the deviations from what
classical game theory would predict (e.g., Bolton
and Zwich 1995; Burnell, Evans and Yao, 1999).
We conducted an initial, but systematic,
investigation of play by adaptive agents, agents
that form and adjust their strategies in response
to experience. The general framework for such
agents is reinforcement learning in the machine
learning literature (Sutton and Barto 1998). Here
we explore computational approaches for
artificial agents to play the ultimatum game,
comparing our results with the classical game
theoretical as well as the experimental (or
behavioral) economics approaches. In particular,
we study the following questions: How do
artificial agents perform in playing the ultimatum

game against fixed rules, dynamic rules, and
rotating rules? How do coevolving artificial
agents behave? Will learning software agents do
better? What does intelligence do to benefit its
holders? What will happen when smart learning
agents play against dumb (no-learning) agents?
What will be the impact of agent memory size on
performance? We provide some initial computer
simulation results to these questions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 outlines our key research
methodologies and implementation details.
Section 3 reports our experimental findings.
Section 4 reports further experiments in order to
study the value of intelligence and the impact of
memory size on agent performance. Section 5
summarizes and discusses future research.
2. Methodology and Implementations
In our framework, artificial agents are modeled
as finite automata (Hopcroft and Ullman 1979;
Wolfram 1994). This framework has been
adopted by a number of previous investigators.
Among them, Binmore and Samuelson (1992),
Sandholm and Crites (1995) and many others
used the framework to study iterated prisoner’s
dilemma (IPD). Kimbrough, Wu and Zhong
(2001) used it to study the MIT “Beer Game”,
where genetic learning artificial agents played
the game and managed a linear supply chain. Wu
and Sun (2002) investigate the electronic market
off-equilibrium behavior of artificial agents in a
price and capacity bidding game using genetic
algorithms (Holland 1992). These are merely
samples to illustrate the validity of this
framework in the literature. See Kimbrough and
Wu (2001) for a survey.
In this study, however, we depart from previous
computational research by integrating several
previous stranded approaches. First, we study a
different game, namely the ultimatum game,
rather than other games such as the IPD, Beer,
Trust, Investment games. Second, in studying
this game we use evolutionary computation to
model agents. This contrasts with the standard
approaches. Third, our agents are using
reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto 1998)
as a key learning mechanism in game playing
while previous studies of the ultimatum game
employ no machine learning. Finally, our agents
are identity-centric rather than strategy-centric as
used in previous studies (e.g., Kimbrough, Wu
and Zhong 2002; Wu and Sun 2002). That is,
our agents may meaningfully be said to have
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individual identities and behavior. They are not
just naked strategies that play and succeed or
fail. Individuals, rather than populations as a
whole, learn and adapt over time and with
experience. Fielding these kinds of agents, we
believe, is needed for e-commerce applications.
We now describe our model and prototype
implementations in more detail, using the
framework of reinforcement learning. We
discuss how the rules or state-action pairs are
embedded in our artificial agents, how the
rewards were set up, the long-term goal of the
game (returns), the specific reinforcement
learning algorithm we designed, and finally our
code design using Java.
Rules (State-Action Pairs) In repeated games,
each game will be treated as an episode. So
within any episode, player A only needs to make
a decision at the beginning, and it is in only
one state during the episode. Keeping things
simple, we do not need a parameter to identify
states, so the rules for player A only include the
action part, which is how much to offer to player
B. The value function is simple:
Q(a) where a ∈ [0,N]
For player B, the action part is either to accept or
to reject, and the state part will the amount
offered by player A. So, we have: a ∈ {Accept,
Reject} and s ∈ [0,N].
Rewards: Both of the players get their rewards
at the end of each episode. The reward for player
A by taking action a will be:
N-a when player B accepts
ra(a) =
0
when player B rejects
and the reward for player B will be
rb (s, a) =

0

when player B rejects

s

when player B accepts

The value for each state-action pair is simply the
average of its rewards during the previous
episodes. (Thus the players assume their
opponents are playing a stationary strategy.) The
value will be updated each time a state-action
pair is visited.
Returns: The long-term return is the total payoff
each player gets by playing the game repeatedly.

Reinforcement Learning: There are two steps
in each episode and one decision point for each
agent. The decision-making at each point is
according to the values of the suitable Q(s, a)
and an ε-greedy policy. With probability 1-ε the
agent chooses the available action that has the
highest Q(s, a) value, and with probability ε the
agent chooses randomly and uniformly among
the other available actions. The pseudo code for
the algorithm is:
Initialize Q(s, a) = 0 for both agents
Repeat (for each episode)
Player A: choose a using ε-greedy policy
Player A: takes action
Player B: observe its state (s = a)
Player B: choose a’ from s using ε-greedy policy
Players A and B: get their rewards r and r’ and
update their value functions.
QA(a) <- QA(a)*(n-1)/n + r/n
QB(s, a’) <- QB(s, a’)*(n-1)/n + r’/n
(where n is the total number that the stateaction pair has been visited)
Until k episodes have been played.
Java Coding: In the first experiment, the
endowment of player A is set to 63, so its rules
as encoded in a binary string have 6 positions,
and consequently the rules for player B have
6+1=7 positions. Model parameters, such as the
length of rules for both agents, ε, endowment
and the number of episodes to play etc. can be
read in from input files. The results of each
episode are written into a plain text file.
3. Experiment Results
The artificial agents play a series of ultimatum
games, first the repeated one-shot game, second
against fixed rules, third against dynamic rules,
fourth against rotating rules, and finally against
another
agent
also
coevolving
under
reinforcement learning.
3.1. Repeated One-Shot Game
In the initial experiment, there is no memory for
either agent, i.e. the agents make their decisions
regardless of the opponent’s last move. Under
the current algorithm design, the agents tend to
find the game-theoretic result of the ultimatum
game, in which player A only offers a tiny
amount. The simulation has been multiply rerun
using the above configuration and the conclusion
was found to be statistically valid. Each time it
converges to a different small number less than
10. As for player B, the dominant strategy is to
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accept. Table 1 is a partial list of the experiment
results.
Table 1: A partial list of the results.
Episode
No.
1
2
3
4
5
…
486
487
488
…
500

A’s
offer
19
6
1
37
37

A’s
payoff
0
0
0
26
52

B’s
action
0
0
0
1
1

B’s
payoff
0
0
0
37
74

3
44
3

22946
22965
23025

1
1

5215
5259
5262

3

23685

1

5295

The results are robust to increases in the
endowments, such as 127, 255 or 1023, with a
larger number of episodes.
These results are not unexpected. Since we set
the reward of a reject action by player B to zero,
and a number greater than zero when player B
chooses to play accept, and since the agents have
no memory of previous play, accepting will be
the better action under any circumstance. Given
B almost always chooses accept, it is better for
player A to offer only a small amount. Changing
the rewards assigned to player B in a way to
favor the reject action when the offer from player
A is relatively low will change the results of the
experiments.
3.2. Learning Agent Against Fixed Rules
Here, the strategies of player B are fixed and
punishment is introduced, so that when the last
offer from player A is no greater than the current
offer, player B will accept it, and otherwise
reject it. Furthermore, a certain degree of
tolerance can be adopted by player B, so that
when the proportion of the current offer from
player A to the endowment is greater than a
certain number p, e.g. 0.8, then B will accept it,
otherwise reject it.
IF (currentOffer >= p* Endowment)
Accept currentOffer
ELSE
Reject currentOffer.
where p is a model parameter that is defined in
the model parameters configuration file.

For player A, if player B accepts his last offer, he
will propose an offer no greater than his last
offer, i.e. suppose player A proposed d t-1 in the
t-1 time period, then at time t, he will make a
selection dt ∈ [0, d t-1].
Cooperation emerged. In our experiment where p
= .40, player A converges on a proposal of
p*Endowment = 40 when the endowment is 100.
In other words, player A is capable of learning
the policy of player B from iterated games.
3.3. Learning Agent Against Dynamic Rules
The lower limit (p) of player B is changing as the
game is being played. The values and the time of
the change are fixed. Table 2 shows the values of
p and the occurrence of the adjustment. The first
row of Table 2 indicates the number of episodes
when a change occurs.
Table 2: The values of p in different episodes.
p

1
0.40

2000
0.35

5000
0.45

7000
0.60

10000
0.40

Agent A can track the change very well given
enough time periods.
3.4. Learning Agent Against Rotating Rules
The lower limit (p) of player B is changing with
a rotating pattern, say
pt-1 = .40, pt = .50, pt+1 = .60.
We want to see if player A can track such a
pattern.
With our current reinforcement learning
algorithm, player A converges to a proposal of
60 which is the highest value of p * 100.
Memory of at least one previous move should be
introduced to the algorithm of player A in order
for A to track the rotated rules of player B.
3.5. Learning Simultaneously
There are no fixed rules for either player A or
player B. They will learn to find good solutions
for themselves.
In this experiment, both players have memory of
their last action. For player A, the state in the
time t period, is player B’s response in t-1
period:
Sat = bt-1
The action of player A in time t is still a proposal
of the ultimatum, dt ∈ [0, N].
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For player B, the state in time t period has two
parameters – the last offer from player A, and his
own response in the time t-1 period:
Sbt = f (dt-1, bt-1)
According to the state signals, player B chooses
his lower limit by which he decides whether or
not to accept the proposal from A. The decisionmaking process for player B can be described as
follows:
IF bt –1 is “accept”
THEN
lt = dt-1
ELSE
lt ∈ [0, N].
The above decision-making process of player A
and B is modeled in Figure 2 using finite
automata:
Agent A:

Accept
Accept

d

Reject

Reject

d*
Accept

d*b
Reject

Agent B:

C
C
l

l=d
D
D

l*

C

D
Figure 2: Decision-making processes for
indefinite ultimatum game. In the lower
diagram, “C” means agent A cooperated in t - 1,
i.e. agent A’s proposal in t-1 was accepted by
agent B; and “D” means agent A defected in t –
1, i.e. agent A’s proposal in t – 1 was rejected by
agent B.
The meanings of Figure 2 are the following. As
shown in the top part of the diagram, Agent A

starts with a random choice of a possible
proposal d ∈ [0, N]. If the proposal is accepted,
agent A will choose the best amount to propose
according to the value of Q(sa, d) where sa = 1
(means accept), and continue doing so as long as
agent B accepts the proposal. Otherwise, agent A
will choose the best amount to propose
according to the value of Q(sa, d) where sa = 0
(means reject), and continue doing so until B
accepts.
In the meantime, as depicted in the lower part of
the diagram, Agent B starts with a random
choice of its lower limit l - acceptable offer. If
agent A cooperates, i.e. its offer exceeds this
lower limit, agent B will set his lower limit the
same as agent A’s last offer and continue doing
do as long as agent cooperates. Otherwise if
agent A decreases its offer (we denote this state
as sb), then agent B will set l ∈ [0, N] to a new
value that maximizes Q(sb, l), until agent A gets
back to propose an acceptable offer.
Now we describe the experimental results.
Cooperation emerges through co-evolution
within 2000 episodes. Player A converges to an
offer of 55 or 56, and correspondingly, player B
converges to setting his lower limit at 55 or 56.
Some open questions arise from this experiment:
Why does it converge at 55 and 56 instead of 50?
Does the result depend on the initial random
choices? We leave this for future theoretical
exploration.
4. Further Experiments
We now describe further experiments to
investigate the value of intelligence and the
impact of memory size on agent behavior. The
questions we are interested in are the following.
Will learning software agents do better? What
good does intelligence do for the agents having
it? What will happen when smart learning agents
play against dumb (no-learning) agents?
4.1. Value of Intelligence
We conducted two experiments to investigate the
value of intelligence. In the first experiment (4a),
we have one smart (learning) agent and many
dumb (no-learning, fixed rule) agents. In the
second experiment (4b), we have a population of
two types of smart agents and many dumb
agents. The goal of these investigations is to
characterize the value of intelligence, i.e.,
whether smart agents would be able to do better
through learning.
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One Smart Agent vs. Multiple Dumb Agents
(4a)
In 4(a), we have three types of dumb agents
using different fixed rules. Without loss of
generality, we assume the following three rules
are being used:
db1: demand/accept 70 or higher;
db2: demand/accept 50 or higher;
db3: demand/accept 30 or higher.

smart agents, the graph depicts the aggregate
behavior and performance of the smart agent
population.
Frequencies of Dumb Agents
1
0.9
0.8
0.7

Greedy
Agents
Fair
Agents

0.5
0.4

Generous
Agents

0.3
0.2
0.1

The results of this experiment show that the fair
agents who propose 50 and accept any amount
greater or equal to 50 take over the dumb agent
population generation by generation. Figure 3
illustrates such a trend. On the other hand, the
smart agents also learn to be fair. Figure 4
illustrates the evolution of the rules one smart
agent chose in the experiment, as well as its
average point score in each generation, as an
indicator of its performance. Although this
evolution procedure is different for different

97

89

81

73

65

57

49

41

33

25

9

Generation

Figure 3: Dynamics of the frequencies of
dumb agents. Parameters used for this
experiment are: Number of generations =100,
number of plays in each generation = 2000,
population size of smart agents = 20, population
size of dumb agents = 90.
Actions and Performances of One Smart
Agent
100
90
80

Proposal

70
60

Response

50
40

Avg.
Rewards

30
20
10
91

81

71

61

51

41

31

21

11

0
1

When a smart agent is chosen to play the game,
he will use reinforcement learning to decide how
much to propose or the minimum amount he
would accept.

17

1

0

Amount

There is a certain possibility (e.g. 25%) that a
smart agent can be chosen to play the game. We
shall keep a running total of the smart agent’s
points. The smart agent can learn via
reinforcement learning. We would like to see if
this smart or learning agent would be able to
learn a generally good or reasonable policy. We
note here that in designing this learning agent,
we have to track the changing population of
dumb agents. In each generation, the experiment
proceeds as follows:
1. Draw one smart agent with 25 percent
possibility; otherwise draw one dumb
agent randomly in proportion to their
frequency
2. Draw another dumb agent randomly in
proportion to their frequency
3. Decide the role of each agent, i.e.
proposer vs. responder
4. Two agents play the game against each
other
5. Record the results
6. Go to the first step until a certain
number of games, e.g. 1000 episodes,
has been played
7. Update the frequency of the dumb agent
based on observed results of the current
or previous time periods.

Freq.

0.6

Generation

Figure 4: Evolution procedure of the rules
used by one smart agent in the smart agent
population.
Multiple Smart Agents and Dumb Agents (4b)
In 4(b), we introduce a population of smart
agents playing against many dumb agents, and
playing against each other as well. Table 3
explains our experimental design. Again, we
assume the dumb agents fall into the above three
types.
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Actions and Performances of One Smart Agent
100
90
80
Proposal

70

Amount

Table 3: Experimental design of 4b.
Responder
Smart (y)
Dumb (1-y)
Smart
(x)
Proposer
Dumb
(1-x)

60

Response

50
40

Avg.
Rewards

30

Frequencies of Dumb Agents

0.43
0.41
0.39

Freq.

0.37

Greedy

0.35

Fair

0.33
Generous

0.31
0.29
0.27
97

89

81

73

65

57

49

41

33

25

9

17

1

0.25
Generation

Figure 5: Dynamics of the frequencies of
dumb agents when smart agents can play
against each other.
Again, the behavior and performance of one
smart agent is illustrated in Figure 6 to portray
the evolution procedure of the overall smart
agent population. Figure 7 depicts the
distribution of the average points of smart
agents.

20
10
91

81

71

61

51

41

31

21

1

0
11

With the same population sizes of smart and
dumb agents, the frequency of fair agents
increases very slowly. This process is not very
smooth for the first 30 generations. We observed
decreasing points in this period. Figure 5 shows
the evolving process of the frequency of dumb
agents within 100 generations.

Generation

Figure 6: Evolution procedure of the rules
used by one smart agent in the smart agent
population while smart agents can play
against each other.
Table 4 summarizes the average of points earned
by different types of agent in 4a and 4b. Again,
the difference between 4a and 4b is that in the
latter, the smart agent could play against another
smart agent while in the former case, the smart
agent only meet with dumb agents (although
there are three types of them). It is clear that in
either case, smart agents and fair agents are
doing well, while greediness or generosity do not
pay. On the other hand, if smart agent plays with
another smart agent, then the average points of
the smart agent as well as the fair agent decrease
a bit - making unusual profit becomes more
difficult, other types of agents (the greedy and
the generous ones pick up a bit). In a sense, the
distribution of wealth in this community or
society becomes a bit “fairer” due to the policy
of allowing smart agents to play with smart
agents.
Table 4: Average points of the agents at the
end of 100th generation.

Smart Agents
Greedy Agents
Fair Agents
Generous Agents
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40.1
30.2
19.9
25.0
43.8
35.1
20.6
25.1
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Freq. / Interval
0.14
0.12
0.1
0.08
Freq. / Interval

0.06
0.04
0.02
0
32

34

36

38

40

42

44

46

48

Figure 7: Distribution of the average points of
smart agents.
4.2. Impact of Memory Size
Table 5 summarizes our findings on the impact
of memory size on agent performance. Where
there is only one learning agent (5a), clearly
longer memory size helps. Where there are
multiple learning agents (5b), and when both
have longer memory size, the payoff decreases a
bit, while the dumb guys pick up. In any case, it
turns out the identity or the type of agent plays
an important role. The greedy agents with a
longer memory benefit more, while the fair
agents remain almost the same (since they try to
be fair anyway), and the generous agents give a
bit more out (due to their generosity). These
findings turn out to be robust across a number of
runs.
Table 5. Impact of memory size. Parameters
used: Number of plays = 2000, dumb agents
population size = 90, smart agent population size
= 20, number of generations = 100.
Agent
Types
Smart
w.
mem.
Smart
w/o
mem.
Greedy
Fair
Gen.

Experiment 5a
(M - Mem. Size)
M=1
M=2
33.3
34.1

Experiment 5b
(M – Mem. Size)
M=1
M=2
26.0
23.7

N/A

N/A

29.9

29.0

21.2
43.2
20.7

22.3
42.8
19.6

25.7
34.7
25.1

26.1
34.1
25.1

5. Conclusions and Future research
Artificial agents using reinforcement learning
have been found to be capable of playing the
ultimatum game efficiently and effectively.
Agent intelligence and memory have been found
to have positive impacts on performance. The
agent-based approach seems consistent with
human behavior. The work here is a first step
and sheds light on the design of cooperative
agent systems in strategic situations in virtual
communities, especially in electronic commerce
such as bargaining and negotiations in supply
chains.
Following the same paradigm, as outlined in
Kimbrough and Wu (2001), we are actively
investigating other strategic games, among them
are two versions of the trust game: “The classical
economic trust game” vs. “The Mad Mex Game”
or “The E-Commerce Game”, see Wu,
Kimbrough and Zhong (2001) for initial results.
These trust games are natural extensions of, yet
much more complicated than, the ultimatum
game as investigated in this paper. However, the
work reported here served as the initial
foundation for subsequent work. We plan to
conduct lab experiments with real agents
(humans) playing the ultimatum game and the
trust game, including games in which real agents
play with our artificial agents. The goals of this
investigation are several-fold: to validate our
model here, to test the predictive quality of our
model, and to explain human decision making
behavior. Our ultimate goal is to develop a
(semi)-automated negotiation support system in
online communities where artificial agents are
integrated with human beings to support human
decision making in electronic marketplace. We
have reported here some first steps in that
direction. Much remains to be done.
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